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1

SOVIET RELIGIOUS POLICY IN THE UKRAINE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Bohdan R. Bociurkiw*
Carleton University

In retrospect,

Soviet religious policy in the Ukraine has to be
The first is that of the centrally

viewed from two main vantage points:

formulated program on religion which the regime attempted to implement through
out the USSR; the second vantage point is that of the peculiar ecclesiastical
situation and the nationality and peasant problems in the Ukraine which led
to modifications and occasional aberrations in the application of this central
church policy to Ukrainian conditions.

In analysing these twin facets of the

regime's ecclesiastical policy in this second-largest Union Republic,

we shall

focus mainly on its majority denomination -- the Orthodox Church -- which during
most of the inter-war period was split into three major groupings -- the
Patriarchal

1

and the Renovationist 2 Churches

Union" churches),

(the local extensions of "All

3
and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) .

Since World War II,

our discussion will also involve the Greek Catholic (Uniate)

Church in the Western Ukraine.

I

In terms of its ultimate objectives and long-range policies on
religion,

the Soviet regime has displayed a striking consistency in aiming

at the complete elimination of religion in the USSR in both its institutional
and its subjective,

psychological aspects.

The invariability of the regime's

position on this point can easily be traced to the Leninist variety of Marxism
with its commitment to "militant atheism" rather than the slow-working, socialeconomic mechanisms of secularization.

At no time,

since 1917,

has this view

of religion been effectively challenged within the Bolshevik Party,

and no

departure from this long-range objective can be detected in the Soviet church

* The author wishes to express his appreciation to the Canadian Institue of
Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta in Edmonton and the Shevchenko
Foundation in Winnipeg

for their support of research leading to this publication.

A brief biographical note about the author is provided at the end of the paper
on p. 16.
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·policy in the Ukrainian SSR.
However, in their choice of means de signed to realize this ultimate
goal and in the timing and application of their short-term relgious policies
to individual churches, nationalities, social strata and regions, the Bolsheviks
have shown both considerable flexibility and contradictory tendencies.

To be

sure, the regime's guide in translating long-term policy into a short-term
tactical line has been the Leninist formula subordinating the antireligious
4
struggle to the larger political and economic objectives of the Party.
However,
differences over the interpretation of these major objectives and their successive
re-interpretations have allowed for considerable vacillation between the two
extremes:

the "leftist, " "anarchist" tendency stressing violence and "administra-

tive methods" in suppressing religion; and the "rightist, " "opportunistic"tendency
-advo��ting:reliance on the anti-religious effects of objective,. socio-economic
proce sses.
Accordingly, two not entirely consistent trends can be detected in the
Soviet church policy.

On one hand, at least until 1938, the Bolshevik leaders

pursued a line aiming at the progressive weakening, strangulation, and destruction
of organized religion in the USSR, alternating increasingly severe repressions
with periods of relatively relaxed pressure whenever accumulating resentment
on the part of the believers or hostile reaction abroad threatened the political
or economic position of the regime.

On the other hand, however, the Bosheviks

persistently strove to "Sovietize" the religious organizations, not merely for
the sake of e stablishing official control over the internal affairs of these
organizations, but in order to use them for the purpose s of both domestic and
foreign policy and propaganda.

The advent of the "New Religious Policy"

with the outbreak of World War II marked the beginning of a shift in Soviet
emphasis, from the destruction of religion to its exploitation as a political
weapon, e specially in the area of foreign relations and propaganda - a tendency
which was not abandoned after Stalin's death despite a marked intensification
of antireligious pressures in the USSR.
These two trends in the Soviet church policy have had their spokesmen
from the very beginning of the Bolskevik regime:

the "fundamentalists" (especially

vocal in the Komsomol and, obviously, the League of Militant Atheists (S. V.B. ) ,
arguing against any official distinctions between the religious groups and
advocating an indiscriminate struggle against all forms of religion; and the
"pragmatists, " to be found among "practical" state officials and the secret
police -- who were favoring the tactic of "rewarding the friends and punishing
the enemies", varying the treatment of the individual religious groups in
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accordance with their re spective attitude s towards the regime and the kind of
contribution they could offer to the achievement of Soviet goals.

Indeed,

it could be argued that these two positions complemented rather than excluded
each other, for the repressive measures against religious groups "conditioned"
them into plain

tools of the official policy, just as the constant threat to

resume such repressions helped to dissuade them from using the concessions
5
obtained from the regime for purposes unacceptable to the Kremlin.
II
The arrival of the Soviet power in the Ukraine in 1919-20 brought
it face to face with a complex ecclesiastical situation which defied a simple,
clear-cut solution.

Neither their ideological arsenal nor their recent experience

with the church-state conflict in Russia had equipped the Bolsheviks with a
ready-made, tested solution to the church problem in the Ukraine.

At the

heart of this problem was a rampant religious nationalism, manifested in the
two-year old Russo-Ukrainian struggle for control of the local Orthodox Church.
The roots of this struggle reached far back into Ukrainian history to the
traditional Orthodox pattern of church- state "symphony," the merger of religious
and national consciousness in the Cossack Ukraine, the subsequent imposition
of Moscow's ecclesiastical supremacy over the Kievan Church and its transformation
by the nineteenth century into an instrument of national and social oppression.
It was inevitable that, with the resurgence of Ukrainian nationalism its demands
for emancipation from Moscow came to be projected onto the ecclesiastical sphere.
as well.

First assuming an organized form with the 1917 revolution and attracting

into its ranks elements of radical and reformist clergy and laymen, the
Ukrainian church movement challenged the Russian leadership of the Orthodox
Church in the Ukraine during 1917-18, demanding the introduction of Ukrainianization, conciliar administration, and autocephaly,

Denied, however, any

effective or timely assistance from the short-lived national Ukrainian government
and encountering uniform hostility from the church hierarchy in the Ukraine, the
movement failed to achieve a canonical realization of its goals.

In frustration,

it turned in 1919 to more radical means -- by taking over and "Ukrainianizing"
individual church parishes from below and bringing them under the jurisdiction
6
of the All-Ukrainian Church Rada counci
in defiance of the local Russian

(

episcopate.

i}

Not yet significant numerically, largely confined to Kiev and

a few other urban centers, the Ukrainian church movement nevertheless found
ethusiastic support among the Ukrainian intelligentsia and could count upon
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a broad base of support among the Ukrainian peasantry in the future.

On the other side of the Ukrainian ecclesiastical "front" was
the predominantly Russian episcopate, equally nationalistic in attitudes,
still in firm control of the Church, protecting the status quo with canonical
barriers and dismissing the demands of the Ukrainian church movement as
"unchurchly, " "s. eparatist" designs upon the unity of the Church and "Holy
Russia".

In the background, wavering between their dislike of the conservative

rule of the monastic bishops and their distrust of Ukrainian nationalism, were
a handful of local church "liberals" and "reformists, " defeated by the conserva
tive majority at the 1918 All-Russian Sobor, largely deserted by-th�ir Ukrainian
following which now joined the national church movement.
With the Bolsheviks entering the Ukrainian scene in 1919, the
configuration of the forces that were to dominate the ecclesiastical life
of the Soviet Ukraine for the next two decades took final shape.

Poised

against each other and yet drawn into passing tactical alignments, reaching
for support into different strata of Ukrainian society, were the Ukrainian
and Russian nationalisms, ecclesiastical liberalism, and the atheistic regime
holding, by its preponderance of physical power, the key to the respective
fates of the other three contenders for the spiritual allegiance of Ukrainian
population.
III
From 1919 on, five principal considerations evidently entered into
the formulation and execution of Soviet church policy in the Ukraine; the
respective weight of each of these considerations depended on the changing
balance of power at the center and in the Soviet Ukrainian leadership, the
larger policy objectives of the moment, and the contingencies of the situation
in the Ukraine.

One of these considerations, of course, was the militant

atheism inherent in the Marxist-Leninist world-view and intensified by the
traditional hostility of the Russian

Left towards the established Church

as the chief ideologist and potent political instrument of the Tsarist
autocracy.

Another, indeed the overriding, determinant of the religious

policy was the political survival of the Soviet regime in the Ukraine.
Closely connected with the latter were two other considerations:

the delicate

and yet acute national question arising from the national and social alie
nation of the new regime from the majority of the population; and the related

...

peasant problem deriving from the absolute numerical predominance of this
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traditionally religious stratum of Ukrainian society, the peasants'
national-cultural aspirations, and the vital importance of Ukrainian
agriculture to the Soviet economy.

Finally, the anticipated or

perceived foreign reaction to Soviet policies on religion and the possible
advantage of employing churches for external propaganda purposes also
influenced Soviet policy makers, particularly in restraining their antireligious zeal.

The varying weight given at different times to these

considerations by the regime in its treatment of the chief ecclesiastical
factions in the Ukraine, makes it possible to identify the several stages
of Soviet church policy in the Ukraine, roughly coinciding with the six
major periods of Soviet political history:

the Civil war;

the NEP; Stalin's

'second revolution from above'� the 'Great Retreat' since the outbreak of
World War II until Stalin's death; Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization"; and the
post-1964 restoration of bureaucratic stability under the Brezhnev rule.
IV
During the first three years of the Soviet rule (19 19-1921), the
immediate problem of political survival overshadowed all other considerations
underlying the regime's religious policy in the Ukraine.

The well known

hostility of the Russian Orthodox Church towards the Bolsheviks, collaboration
of its leading hierarchs with the Volunteer Army, and its open defiance of the
Soviet decrees on religion made the former Established Church the main target
of the Communist antireligious measures.

It was primarily to weaken and split

the Russian Church, and not because of any sympathies for the Ukrainian church
movement that the latter initially received qualified support from the authorit
7
ies in its efforts to resurrect a national Ukrainian church, the efforts which
by October 1 921 culminated in the formation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church (UAOC), canonically and hierarchically separate from the
8
Russian and other Orthodox Churches.
But the hopes which the Bolsheviks
may have had that the UAOC would evolve into
"Soviet" church never materialized.

a

"progressive", "Living",

Before long, the phenomenal growth

of the new church, its intensely national orientation, and its appeal to
those strata of Ukrainian society which would not accept the new regime or
were not acceptable to the latter, evoked, in the eyes of the Party and the
GPU, a spectre of a "Petliurite-kulak counterrevolution" in ecclesiastical
9
disguise.
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From 1922 on, the authorities centered their efforts on the
implantation in the Ukraine of a collaborationist "Living Church" (later
10
"Renovationist Church" ), after the latter managed to seize, with the help
from the police, the Patriarchal administration in Moscow.
massive

To this end,

propaganda and administrative measures were employed to break the

resistance of the Patriarchal Church in the Republic.

Meanwhile, unable

to force the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church into a merger with the Renovationists,
the authorities attempted to launch a "progressive revolution" within the
UAOC by manipulating factional and personal tensions in the Autocephalist
11
ranks.
Having failed again, the authorities turned to administrative and
police repressions against the UAOC.

In 19 23, the Church's leading organ -

the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council - was declared illegal an� in 1 9 2�
the GPU arrested Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi and a number of other Auto
cephalist leaders.

In the meantime, the government-supported Renovationist

Church in the Ukraine proclaimed a token autocephaly in the hope of attracting
12
followers from the ranks of the UAOc.
The continued unpopularity of the Renovationists among the rank
and-file believers led the regime to shift its tactics in the direction of
the "Sovietization" of the Patriarchal and Autocephalous Churches in the
Ukraine.

In July 1 9 27, after repeated arrests, the Acting Patriarchal

Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergii, issued his well known Declaration pledging
on behalf of the Russian Church an unconditional loyalty to the Soviet State;
this act of submission to the new regime restored legal status to the Patriarchal
Church in the Ukraine.

At the same time, under police threats and promises

of concessions, the 1 9 27 Sober of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church dismissed
Metropolitan Lypkivskyi and other "politically compromised" Autocephalist
leaders.

Under its new canonical head, Metropolitan Mykolai Boretskyi, the

UAOC pledged itself to a loyal but apolitical course and accepted a much more
13
pervasive governmental control over its activities.
Limited concessions secured by the Patriarchal and Autocephalous
churches in the Ukraine in return for "normalization" of their relations with
the state, proved to be short-lived.

By the end of 1928, a major turning point

was reached by the Soviet religious policy, as the Stalin regime embarked on a
massive attack against the "survivals" of the old social-economic order and
culture.

Simultaneously with its collectivization drive, the Party opened

a broad, frontal attack against all religious groups in the country, including
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In the Ukraine, where "bourgeois

the hitherto favourized "Renovationists".

nationalism" was now recognized as the "greater danger" (than the "great power
chauvinism" of the Russians), the main blows were aimed at the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Church as perhaps the most massive institutional expression of
popular "Uk.rainization" movement. l4

By early 19 30, approximately three-fourths

of the Autocephalist parishes were suppressed by the authorities; a number of
bishops and lay leaders of the UAOC were arrested by the GPU �n fabricated
charges of "counterrevolutionary activities", with the authorities denouncing
the Autocephalous Church as allegedly a branch of the recently "unmasked"
15
"Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine" (SVU).
Without waiting for the
show trial of the "Union", the GPU hastened to stage the so-called "Extraordinary
Sobor" of the UAOC in January 19 30, which "voted" for "self-dissolution" of the
16
Church
as a "nationalist, political, counter-revolutionary organization. "!?
Nevertheless, in December 1 9 30,remnants of the UAOC were allowed to
reorganize under

a

new name as the "Ukrainian Orthodox Church", now headed by

Metropolitan Ivan Pavlovskyi of Kharkiv.

The new church organization had to

dissociate itself formally from the three principles of the UAOC--autocephaly,
Uk.rainianization and conciliar self-government--and to commit its members to
18
Soviet patriotism and an unconditional loyalty to the regime.
This involuntary
"Sovietization" did not save Metropolitan Pavlovskyi's Church; by 1 9 36 the
authorities suppressed, in Kharkiv, the last parish of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church, imprisoning its remaining bishops, including Pavlovskyi.

Early in

arrested the now retired Metropolitan Lypkivskyiwho, too, was
19
never t o b e heard from again.
19 38, the

NKVD

The Great Purges of 19 3 7- 38, virtually destroyed

also the Patriarchal

and Renovationist organizations in the Ukraine leaving behind only a handful of
scattered and unorganized local parishes. Completely shattered were the Roman
Catholic, Protestant, and Judaic communities.
While the entire hierarchy of all three Orthodox factions in the
Ukraine had been wiped out by 19 38, the Patriarchate and the Renovationist
Synod in Russia escaped anihillation.
explained at least in two ways.

This seeming inconsistency may be

Firstly, with foreign opinion focusing its

attention on developments at the center, the survival of and suitable pronounce
ments by the leaders of the Patriarchate and the Synod could demonstrate to the
world the continued "freedom of conscience" in the USSR.

Secondly, both of the

"controlled churches"--but especially the Patriarchal Church, even if reduced to
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skeleton apparatus

20

--could prove useful in facilitating Soviet control

over the still-large believing portion of the population and in promoting
the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet government, especially in dealing
with the churches outside the Soviet Union.
v

Though the period of Stalin's "New Religious Policy" is usually
dated from the celebrated meeting of Stalin and Molotov with the three senior
21
hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate in September, 1943,
it is clear that
the genesis of this paradoxical "symphony" between the remnants of the Russian
Orthodox Church and the atheist regime goes back at least to 1939.

It was

the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland and MOscow's annexation of the Western
regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia, followed by the occupation of Bukovyna,
Bessarabia and the Baltic States--that gave a new lease on life to the near
moribund Moscow Patriarchate.

Suddenly, the Kremlin found political use for

the intimidated loyal churchmen as instruments of Sovietization and Russification
of the numerous and vigorous Orthodox communities in the newly annexed territories.
Through the extension of the Moscow Patriarchate's jurisdiction over the dioceses
in the annexed areas, the latter were to be purged of disloyal or suspect leaders;
the emissaries of the Patriarchate were entrusted with the job of policing the
"reunited" church organization so as to prevent it from offering asylum to the
dislodged anti-Soviet political forces, especially in the Western Ukraine with
its history of intense Ukrainian nationalism.

Accordingly, during 1939-4 1,

Patriarchal exarchs Panteleimon Rozhnovskii and Nikolai Iarushevich carried
out, with the regime blessings, "reunion" of the Volyn and Polissia dioceses,
eliminating the Ukrainian language from liturgical usage, and even laying out
plans for the future "conversion" of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics in Galicia,

22

The Kremlin's shift towards a more pragmatic religious policy was
nevertheless of a limited and tentative nature.
to the Church in the "old" Soviet territories:

No concessions were extended
by June 1941, probably no more

than one dozen Orthodox churches remained open in the Ukrainian SS R east of the
Zbruch river.

Nor were the Western oblasti spared from exposure to vulgar

anti-religious propaganda,

Within months of Soviet invasion, all landed

property of churches and monasteries was confiscated; theological schools,
religious publications, charitable institutions and lay organizations were
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summarily suppressed, and all Catholic monasteries and convents were disbanded in the Western Ukraine.

Excessive, discriminatory taxation was

imposed upon the clergy and a number of them were arrested, deported or
executed. 23

Nevertheless, for the time being, the new authorities stopped

short of implementing in the Western oblasti some of the most destructive
provisions of Soviet ecclesiastical legislation, most likely due to their
still insecure position in the occupied territories and their growing anxiety
about the Nazi designs upon the USSR.
The major turning point came with the German invasion of the USSR
in June 1941.

The spontaneous revival of religious life in the Ukraine and

other Nazi-occupied territories was undoubtedly one of several factors that
led Stalin's regime to suspend antireligious

propaganda and to allow limited

restoration of church organization and religious activities in the Soviet-held
areas, especially those threatened by further German advance.

At the same time,

war crisis made it imperative for the Kremlin to seek support from all sections
of Soviet population, including the masses of the long persecuted believers.
The regime's appeals to Russian nationalism, the rehabilitation of the old
Tsarist symbols and heroes for the purposes of the "Great Patriotic War" made
it easier for the Russian Orthodox Church to rationalize its new alliance with
the Soviet Government, while the latter could now more readily rely on the loyal
Church as an instrument of national policy and external propaganda.

The process

of reconciliation between the Patriarchate and the Kremlin culminated by
September 1 9 4 3 in a whole range of concessions given to the Russian Orthodox
Church:

the latter was now accorded a paradoxical position of a "quasi

established church" in an atheist state, including direct access to Soviet
leaders, a separate agency for the management of its relations with the
Government (all other recognized churches were placed under a separate "Council
for the Affairs of Religious Cults"),

exclusive right to "missionary" activit

ies among the non-Orthodox believers, as well as the permission to reopen a
number of theological and monastic institutions (and to retain those found in
the reoccupied territories) on a scale denied to any other beneficiary of
Stalin's "new religious policy."

Secretly in 1945, the Church was restored

juridical rights, including the right to own property, but with a significant
exception of the houses of worship and their contents. 24
The developments in the Ukraine after it was retaken by the Soviet
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armies in 1 943-44 offered the most striking demonstration of the overlapping
interests of the Russian Church and the Soviet State.

The two joined in the

liquidation of the remnants of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church
which was revived during the German occupation; the Autoc�phalist parishes
were taken over by the Russian Church while the state authorities took care
of the "recalcitrant" clerics.

The Moscow Patriarchate welcomed back into

its ranks the remaining episcopate and clergy of the pro-Russian Autonomous
Church in the Ukraine, granting immunity from prosecution to those "reunited"
churchmen who happened to collaborate with the German occupation authorities.
By 19 45, following a meeting between Stalin and the newly elected
Patriarch Alexii, the state and the Church joined in a massive assault against
the central national institution in Galicia and Transcarpathia--the Greek
Catholic (Uniate) Church, in a pattern closely resembling the Tsarist suppression of the Uniates in the 1830s.

Soviet anti-Uniate propaganda was syn-

chronized with the Patriarchate's appeals to the Ukrainian Catholics to aban
don Rome.

As the entire Uniate episcopate was arrested in April 1 9 4 5, the

Russian Church dispatched its bishop to Lviv to mastermind the so-called
"reunion" campaign.

With the decisive assistance from the administration,

the secret police and the military a pseudo-Sobor was staged in Lviv, in March
1946, to supply a semblance of a "voluntary" and "canonic" dissolution of
the Union with Rome and the so-called "return" of the Uniates to the Russian
Orthodox Church.

Numerous Greek Catholic priests who could not be persuaded

by Orthodox and police "missionaries" were given lengthy prison and forced
labor camp sentences for their alleged "bourgeois nationalist" and pro-German
25
. . .
during the war.
act1v1t1es
To the Russian Church the ecclesiastical conquest of the Western
Ukraine meant the realization of its long-standing objectives of bringing all
Eastern Slavs under the Moscow Patriarchal See.

To the Soviet authorities,

the destruction of the Uniate Church appeared to be an integral part of their
battle against formidable Ukrainian nationalist resistance in Galicia, as well
as a major step towards the cultural integration of the Western Ukraine in the
Soviet Russian empire.

To be sure, the formal "reunion" of the Ukrainian

Uniates completed by 1 9 4 9 , with the suppression of the Union in Transcarpathia,
was more apparent than real; while the decimated Greek Catholic Church was left
with an aura of martyrdom that helped it to retain the loyalties of the West
Ukrainian believers, no amount of propaganda could "legitimatize" the Russian
Church in the eyes of its involuntary "converts", with most of the "reunited"
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-·clergy remaining Catholic in pectore.
The Russian Orthodox Church was the principal but not the only
beneficiary of Stalin's religious NEP in the Ukraine.

Several Protestant

groups were allowed to resume their activites, though at a price of merging
into the government-supervised Union of the Evangelical Christians
Baptists (ECB).

(and]

Separate Ukrainian Protestant organizations which existed

in the Western Ukraine prior to Soviet annexation were suppressed and their
flock forced into the new Union.

The Seventh Day Adventists and Hungarian

Calvinists were being tolerated by the authorities, but not those Pentecostalists
who refused to give up "speaking in tongues" or the "subversive" Jehovah's
Witnesses.

After the repatriation of most Poles from the Western Ukraine,

only small number of Roman Catholic parishes were permitted to continue, but
without a bishop or even a vicar general of their own.

The survivors of the

Nazi Holocaust were able to reopen a number of synagogues and minyamins in
the Republic; by 1949, following the suppression of all secular Jewish organ
izations, they remained the only institutional expressions of Jewish culture.
Compared with other Union Republics, the post-war l*raine displayed the greatest diversity and concentration of religious communities in the USSR.

Though

accounting for only 1 9 % of the total population, the Ukrainian SSR contained
the majority of all Orthodox and Pentecostalist congregations and approximately
26
one half of the Evangelical-Baptist communities.
Before long, however, the regime began to tighen up screws on religious
activities.

Already in 1944, a Central Committee resolution ordered the Party

to resume what has then been euphemistically described as "propaganda of naturalscientific vie�vs."

By 194 7, the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of

Political and Scientific Knowledge (renamed later Society "Knowledge") was
explicitly entrusted with the task of "scientific atheist" propaganda.

From

1948 on, virtually no new churches, monasteries or theological school would
be allowed by the authorities.

Apparently, the regime had now less use for

the Russian Church and other "loyal" denominations as instruments of political
integration and external propaganda.
VI
Stalin's death and the subsequent emergence of Nikita Khrushchev
as the dominant figure in the ruling oligarchy, could not but affect the
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future course of Soviet church policy.

As the new leadership undertook

selective de-Stalinization, Stalin's "new religious policy" undoubtedly
came under review.

The short-lived anti-religious campaign of 1 9 54 with
27
its two conflicting Central Committee resolutions
very likely reflected
the still unresolved differences within the Kremlin over this aspect of
Stalin's legacy.

Khrushchev's victory over the so-called "Anti-Party

Group," signalled the beginning of a new, "fundamentalist" stage in Soviet
religious policy, in line with the Khrushchevite "return to Leninism"
campaign, and the new emphasis on the mass resocialization measures to
compensate for the weakening of coercive social controls.
Coinciding with the announced start of "the building oL'Communism,"
28
massive and occassionally violent anti-religious campaign began in 1958.
The "loyal" religious leaders were now compelled by the regime not only
"voluntarily" to restrict the activities of their denominations and to
close down the majority of churches, theological and monastic institutions,
but also to reassure the world outside that there was absolutely no truth
in the multiplying reports about the new persecution of religion in the
Soviet Union.

Servility and lying did not help the official religious

leaders to protect their respective churches from massive loses, while at
the same time they seriously eroded the credibility they have had in the
eyes of the harassed believers.

Along with the gross violations of legality

accompaning the mass "deregistration" of congregations and the clergy, this
loss of trust in the state-approved church leaders contributed to the emergence
of religious dissent movements, at first among the Evangelical Christians
29
[and) Baptists, and the Orthodox, later in other denominations as we11.
In the Ukraine, about one-half of churches were closed in the
course of the 1958-1964. The number of Orthodox parishes in the Republic
30
31
was reduced from a 1950 total of some 8,ooo to 4,500, by 1976,
amounting
32
to 65% of all "registered" churches in the USSR.
The greatest losses
were suffered by dioceses located in the eastern regions of the Ukr. SSR;
e.g. , the number of Orthodox churches in the Poltava-Kremenchuk diocese
33
fell between 1958 and 1964 from 340 to mere 52.
Two out of the three
Orthodox seminaries in the Ukraine (in Kiev and Lutsk) were closed down.

34
The only surviving theological school, in Odessa (118 students in 19 74-75 ),
has been able to fill in only part of the vacancies in the ranks of the
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parish clergy.
Of the 1 34 new clergymen ordained for
the Ukraine
35
during 1 9 74,
the larger part must have graduated from the theological
schools in Leningrad (which has had a disproportionately high percentage
of Ukrainian students) and Hoscow.

As most applicants to theological

seminaries come from the Western Ukrainian dioceses (and many of them are
suspected by the authorities of harbouring Ukrainian nationalist sentiments
or even of being secret Uniates), the Council for Religious Affairs introduced

�

a restrictive quota for admission of Hest Ukrainians to all theological school .
Khrushchev's antireligious campaign was particularly destructive
37
of monasticism in the l�raine.
O f the 3 8 monasteries and convents, 29 were
closed do�vn, including the Kievo-Pecherska Lavra (the Kievan monastery of the
Caves)-- the oldest and most revered monastery in the land.

Reporting, in

1 9 75, to the CPSU Central Committee about the C. R. A. activities, its vice
chairman V. Furov admitted that:
Guided by instructions from the leading (direktivnye) organs,
considerable work was carried out locally during the last years
to reduce the netwo�k of monasteries.

To this very end, the

Council for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church
of C. R. A

J

used also its increased influence on the Patriarchate and

the bishops.
monasteries

the (E redecessor

With the hands of the churchmen, several tens of

[and

convent

J were

closed down.

In 19 63, under a use-

ful pretext (landslides in the caves, the necessity to examine the
soil and make repairs), the Kievo-Pecherska Lavra was closed: it
38
used to attract each year close to 500,000 pilgrims.
Only 9 monastic institutions survived in the l&raine (16 in the entire
USSR): monasteries in Pochaiv (with 45 monastics in 19 7 0) and Odessa (39 );
and seven convents (including two in Kiev) with a 19 7 0 total of 755 nuns and
39 i
s nce the late 19 50's severe restrictions have also been imposed
novices.
on admissions to monasteries and convents, their activities and income, and
40
the accessibility of monastic shrines to pilgrims.
Paradoxically, "de-Stalinization" which so detrimentally affected
the once privileged "patriotic" Church, brought some benefits to the largest
of the banned churches--the l&rainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church.

Though

the authorities ignored numerous Uniate appeals for the rehabilitation of their
Church, Khrushchev's penal reforms enabled a number of the Ukrainian Catholic

36
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priests who have refused "conversion" to Orthodoxy--those who survived
their lengthy imprisonment and exile--to return to the Western Ukraine.
41
under whose
Among them were two surviving bishops o f the martyr Church,
guidance the Catacomb Church was able significantly to revive its activities
in Galicia

Though the imprisoned Primate of the Church, Metropolitan

•

. Josyf Slipyj was not allowed to rejoin his flock, in early 19 63, he was
released from imprisonment and sent away from the

USSR in response to

Papal -American intervention on his behalf, a consession which Khrushchev
hoped would encourage further development of detente between the Vatican
42
and the Krem in.

�

VII
Khrushchev's sudden removal in Fall 1 9 64 soon brought to halt
the country-wide attack on religion.

Though the new "collective leader-

ship" would not restore to religious organizations their lost rights, churches,
monasteries, and theological schools, from now on the emphasis of Soviet
church policy was to be on gradual, more subtle and indirect attack on
institutional religion.

The emphasis was now to be placed primarily on

atheist "conversion" of the flock and the replacement of religious holidays,
rites and ceremonies with Communist substitutes, with the natural attrition
of the clergy expected to progressively shrink the churches' institutional
base.
Despite the losses suffered by religious groups in the Republic, the
Ukraine has retained after 1 9 64 its predominant share of religious congregations in the USSR.

Within the Republic, its Western oblasti with 20% of popu-

-

lation now held over 60% of all Orthodox congregations as the authorities were
reluctant to close many churches in areas where their flock may rejoin the banned
Uniate Church; at the same time, the concentration of anti-religious measures
primarily on urban areas has restricted Orthodox Church mainly to rural areas
43
where 98% of all still open churches were now located.
This shift in its
regional and social base has had somewhat unexpected ethno-cultural consequences
for the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine; it now made it dependent on the
Ukrainian peasant strata, least affected by Russification, and on the Western
Ukraine, with its intensely nationalistic population.

Not accidentally, the

once solidly Uniate Lviv-Ternopil diocese with its 9 58 churches and 609 priests
in 1 9 78, represents the largest (and least decimated during 1 9 58-64)
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diocese of the entire Orthodox Church in the USSR.

44

To adjust to its changed social base, the Russian Orthodox
Church in the Ukraine had to undergo limited Ukrainianizationta process
which has been associated since 1966 with the activities of the new Patriarchal
Exarch of the Ukraine, Metropolitan Filaret Denysenko (*1929), the first
Ukrainian in more than 150 years to be apnointed Metropolitan of Kiev and
Halych.

During his tenure, the Orthodox episcopate in the Republic became

predominantly Ukrainian, with more than half of bishops recruited from the
45
Western oblasti which were annexed since Horld War II.
Since 19 68, the
Exarchate has resumed publication of its l�rainian-language monthly,
Pravoslavnyi visnyk (The Orthodox Herald), suppressed during Khrushchev's
antireligious campaign; it has also produced a l�rainian prayer book, and
started annual publication of Ukrainian Orthodox calendars.

It appears

that the continuing threat faced by the official Orthodox Church from the
46
catacomb Uniate Church in the Western Ukraine, Moscow's hopes for the
enentual "reunion" of the Ukrainian Orthodox abroad, and the Patriarchate's
desire to neutralize the influence of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the
West have supplied additional motives for this limited ecclesiastical
It is important to note, however, that this Ukrainianization
47
tendency has not touched the sole surviving theological seminary in Odessa,
Ukrainization.

that Russian language still prevails in sermons and church administration
in city churches outside the Western oblasti, and that even in these oblast
Ukrainian may not be used as liturgical language.
Despite the incessant harrassment by the police and slanderous
propaganda attacks suffered by the banned Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church,
the latter continues its activities in G alicia and the Transcarpatian oblast
as well as in the areas of resettlement and deportation of West Ukrainians.
While its exiled primate, Cardinal Josyf Slipy_i, resides in Rome, the Uniate
flock is being served by several secretly or dained bishops
and three to four hundred priests as well as several female and male monastic
orders.

The political and ecclesiastical "d� tente" which has characterized

the Vatican-Moscow relations since the early 1960 's while probably averting
more severe soviet repressions, has severely tested the Uniates' loyalty to
Rome and their Church's morale and cohesion.
Lookings in retrospect at the effect of Soviet policies on religion
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in the Ukraine one can list such regime "successes" as the e stablishment of
effective external and internal controls over the Russian Orthodox Church,
the Union of Evangelical Christians

(and]

Baptists, and other "loyal denomin

ations; the suppre ssion of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church; and
the driving into the catacombs the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church.

On the

other hand, the regime failed, despite massive propaganda and police measures,
to eliminate growing religious underground or to stem the tide of religious
dissent.

Neither were the Communist authorities entirely successful in

their efforts to displace religiosity in society with the so-called "scientific
atheism. "

While the maiority of the Ukraine's population today may be con-

sidered areligious�8

secularization has been due more to the rapid socio

economic and demographic change s than to the atheist indoctrination, though
the permeation of the school curriculum with antireligious orientation undoubtedly has not been without effect on . children and youth.

The problem

is that secularization has also undermined the credibility of the official
ideology, generating scepticism and pragmatism rather then "militant atheism."
What more, the increasingly manifest linkage between atheist indoctrination
and Russification ("internationalist education") in the Ukraine, has brought
home to the nationally-conscious Ukrainians a much greater realization of the
fundamental inter-dependence of traditional religion and national culture.�

It is futile to speculate about the future fate of religion in the Soviet
Ukraine beyond the obvious assumption that so long as the regime will continue
to pursue its antireligious struggle without relenting on its monopoly of
political and moral "truth", it will actually contribute to the survival of
religion against the onslaught of modernization, as religion remains the only
readily available, alternative belief-system, the sole stable set of moral
values, and the unfalsified link with the nation's past.
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University of Alberta.
Co-editor (with John Long) of Religion and
Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe · (Univ. of Toronto Press, 1 9 7 5),
and author of a large number of articles, he is the former director of
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1.

The Russian Orthodox Church
again, since November 1 9 1 7,
the Ukraine, a title of the
has been attached to Kievan
1 9 21.

(R.O. C.) or the Moscow Patriarchate headed
by "Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus." In
"Patriarchal Exarch of the Entire Ukraine"
Metropolitans of the R.O.C. since August

2.

Renovationism (Rus. obnovlenchestvo), an offshoot of the frustrated
reform movement withing the R.O.C., which joined forces with the Soviet
regime in 1922 to seize the central administration of the Russian Church.
Comprising predominantly the "white" (married) clergy, the Renovationist
movement sought to introduce "progressive" reforms in the Church, incl.
the replacement of the Moscow Patriarchate with a synodical form of church
government, to bring the Church doctrine and political orientation in line
with Soviet policies and to purge the Church of "reactionaries", \vhile
hoping to improve the legal and material position of the clergy under
the Soviet regime.
Though it enjoyed active support from the Soviet
authorities, the Renovationist Church failed to attract any significant
following among believers and was largely disowned by the authorities, after
the Moscow Patriarchate was forced in 1927 into political submission to the
regime.
On the rise and fall of the Renovationist Church in the Soviet
Ukraine, see this writer's "The Renovationist Church in the Soviet Ukraine,
1922-19 39," in The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Science in the
U.S., IX (19 61), No. 1-2 (27-28), 4 1-74.

3.

For the most extensive treatment of the UAOC available, see I. Vlasovskyi,
Narys istorii Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy, IV, Part I (New York-Bound
Brook, 1961).

4.

See this writer's "Lenin and Religion," in L. Schapiro and P. Reddaway (eds.),
Lenin--The Man, The Theorist, The Leader:
A Reappraisal (London, 196 7),
107-134.

5.

The preceding discussion largely summarizes this writer's "The Shaping of
Soviet Religious Policy," Problems of Communism, XXII, No. 3 (May-June 1 9 7 3),
3 7-51.

6.

The All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council was first formed by the Ukrainian
autocephalist movement in late fall 1 9 1 7 to convene an All-L�rainian Church
Sobor.
It was re-established in 1919 and, with the movement's secession
from the R.O.C. in May 1920, it assumed the leadership of the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

7.

The Autocephalists were the first to recognize (and take advantage of) the
new Soviet legislation on religion.

8.

Unilateral revision of Orthodox canons undertaken by the First All-Ukrainian
Sobor of October 19 21, incl. the indroduction of married episcopate and its
consecration by Sobor, without canonically-ordained bishops, isolated the
UAOC from all other Orthodox Churches and exposed it to condemnation by the
R.O.C. as "schismatic" and "sectarian," while alienating from the new Church
some of the original leaders of the Ukrainian national church movement.
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Cf. Ivan Sukhopliuev, Ukrainski avtokefalisty (Kharkiv, 1925).

10.

The "Living Church"--the most radical and pro-Soviet of the several factions
comprising the Renovationist movement, which led the 1922 attack on the
Patriarchate.
It lost control of the movement by 1923 to the more con
servative wing of the movement--"The Union of Congregations of the Ancient
Apostolic Church" (SODATs) led by A. Vvedenskii.

11.

In particular, the differences between supporters of radopraviie (conciliar,
lay-dominated church government) and the more conservative episcopate of
the UAOC.
See Sukhopliuev, op. cit.; Vlasovskyi, £R· cit.; and Metropolitan
Vasyl Lypkivskyi, Istoriia Ukrainskoi Tserkvy, Rozdil VII: Vidrodzhennia
Ukrainskoi Tserkvy (Winnipeg, 1961).

12.

Though it declared itself "authocephalous" at its May 1 9 25 Sober in Kharkiv,
the Renovationist Church remained predominatly Russian and retained its
membership in the Renovationist Holy Synod of the Orthodox Churches of the
USSR; in December 1 9 34, the latter nullified the "authocephaly" of then
moribund Renovationist Church in the Ukraine (A.A. Shishkin, Sushchnost
i kriticheskaia otsenka 'obnovlencheskogo' raskola russkoi pravoslavnoi
tserkvi [Kazan, 19 7 Ql , 27 3)

13.

See Vlasovski, �· cit. 198, 207.

14.

At the peak of its influence, the UAOC might have had as many as three to
six million followers.
See Archbishop Iosif [Krechetovich], Proiskhozhdenie
i sushchnost samosviatstva lipkovtsev (Kharkiv, 1925), 1; and Archbishop
Serafim (Ladde), "Die Lage der Orthodoxen Kirche in der Ukraine," Eiche,
X (19 31), No. 1, 11-40.

15.

See the communique of the GPU of the Ukr. SSR, in Izvestiia, Nov. 22, 1929.
The alleged connection between the UAOC and the SVU appears to have been a
crude fabrication on the part of the Soviet police and the procuracy, to
provide a pretext for the suppression of the Church.

16.

The "Extraordinary Sober" was forced to condemn the fundamental principles
of the UAOC:
"it was completely logical that autocephaly should become a
symbol of Petliurite independence, that Ukrainianization should be exploited
as a means of inciting national enmity, and that conciliarism ( sobornopravnist)
"
should transform itself into a demagogical means of political influence
(emphasis supplied). D. Ihnatiuk, Ukrainska avtokefalna tserkva i Soiuz
Vyzvolennia Ukrainy) (Kharkiv-Kiev, 1 9 3 0), 30-31.

1 7.

Ibid.

18.

See the "Appeal" of the All-Ukrainian Church Provisional Organizational
Committee" of June 9, 19 30 (Archive of Archbishop Ievhen Bachynskyi,
Bulle, Switzerland).

19.

M. Iavdas (ed.), Materiialy do Pateryka Ukrainskoi
Avtokefalnoi Pravoslavnoi
Tserkvy (Munich, 1 951), 22-23.

20.

At the t � me of the Soviet invasion of Poland
in Sept. 1 9 3 9 , there were only
�ur ac � 1ve bishops left in the entire Russian Orthodox Church.
For an
1nside account of the Moscow Patriarchate
on the eve of World War II
see Metropolitan Sergii (Voskresenskii),
"Tserkov v SSSR pered voinoi ' :,
in Rossiia (New York), Oct. 9-13, 1 945.
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The Sept. 4th meeting, attended by the Patriarchal Locum Tenens,
Metropolitan Sergii, and Metropolitans Aleksii of Leningrad and
Nikolai of Kiev, was followed by a succession of major concessions
to the Russian Orthodox Church.

22.

See the Moscow Patriarchate's ukaz No. 167/a of March 1941, announcing
the appointment of Archimandrite Panteleimon Rudyk as Bishop of Lviv
for the solidly Uniate Galicia, to direct "reunification" efforts there.
Such appointment, preceded by a visit of Metropolitan Nikolai Iarushevich
to Lviv (Feb. 22-23, 19 41), could not have occured without the approval
of the Soviet authorities who, characteristically, wiped out Uniate
missionar¥ organization in the Orthodox Volyn and Polissia. An original
copy of the decree is held in the Museum Archive of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church in U.S.A. at South Bound Brook, N.J. (Prof. I. Vlasovskyi
Archive, File No. 142).

23.

See Metropolitan Sheptytskyi's reports to the Holy See of August 30 and
Nov. 7, 1941, reproduced in P. Blet et al., Actes et documents du Saint
Siege relatifs a la seconde querre mondi;le, 7 vols. (Citta del Vaticano,
1967-1973), Vol. 3, Part I, Nos. 297 and 324.

24.

The respective resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the
USSR dated August 22, 1945, was announced to Patriarch Aleksii in a letter
of August 28, 1945, from the Chairman of the Council for Affairs of the
Russian Orthodox Church, G.G. Karpov. For the text of the letter (still
unpublished in the USSR), see D. Loeber, "Die Rechtsstellung der Kirche
in der Sowjetunion," in WGA--Die wichtigeten Gesetzgebungsakte in der
Laender Ost-, Suedeuropas und in den ostasiatischen Volksdemokratien
(Hamburg), VII, No. 5 (Oct. 1966), 272. Subsequently, in an unpublished
decree of August 29, 1945, liberal taxation benefits were granted by
the Council of People's Commissars to churches and monastic institutions
(ibid., 274).

25.

For a more extensive account of the "reunion" campaign in Galicia and
Transcarpathia, see this writer's "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine:
A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy," Canadian Slavonic Papers, VII ( 1965),
89-1 13; I, Hrynioch, "The Destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in
the Soviet Union," Prologue (New York), Vol. IV (1960), 5-51; and, on
Transcarpathia, V. Markus, Nyshchennia Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy v
Mukachivskii eparkhii v 1945-1950 rr. (Paris, 1962).

26.

V. K. Tancher, Prychyny isnuvannia relihiinykh perezhytkiv v SRSR (Kiev,
1959), 4; Vsesoiuznoe obshshestvo po rasprostraneniiu politicheskikh i
nauchnykh znanii, Nauka i religiia (Moscow, 1957), 396.

27.

Secret CC Resolution "On Maj or Shortcomings in the Scientific-Atheist
Propaganda and on Measures to Improve It" of July 7, 1954 (first published
only in 1961); and published CC Resolution (signed by Khrushchev personally)
"On Errors in the Conduct of the Scientific-Atheist Propaganda among the
Population" of Nov. 10, 1954.
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For some of the still unpublished Party and government orders and
instructions of the two councils on religious affairs attached to
the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which guided this antireligious
campaign, see V. A. Kuroedov and A. S. Pankratov (eds.), Zakonodavstvo
o religioznykh kultakh (Sbornik materialov i dokumentov), 2nd ed., rev.
(Moscow, 1971) which was issued for internal (sluzhebnyi) use only; its
equivalent in the Ukrainian SSR appeared two years later:
K. z. Lytvyn
and A. I. Pshenychnyi (eds.), Zakonodavstvo pro relihiini kulty
(Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv) (Kiev, 19 73). Characteristically,
both Kuroedov and Lytvyn (who are chairmen of the Councils for Religious
Affairs at the All-Union level and in the Ukrainian SSR, respectively)
have recently published articles on the status of religious organizations
in the Soviet Union which directly contradict some of the secret official
documents reproduced in volumes they edited, documents which attest to
the far reaching, arbitrary and discriminatory regime intervention into
affairs of religious organizations.

29.

For a systematic discussion of religious dissent in the USSR, see this
writer's testimony and prepared statement to U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittees of International Political and Military Affairs and on
International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations
on June 24, 1976, and reproduced in the transcript of the Subcommittees'
Hearings under the title Religious Persecution in the Soviet Union
(Washington, D.C., 1976), 3-26.

30.

Ie. V. Safonova, Ideino-vykhovna robota Komunistychnoi partii sered
trudiashchykh vyzvolenykh raioniv Ukrainy v roky Velykoi Vitchyznianoi
viiny (1943-1945 rr.) (Kiev, 1971), 117. Citing a document from the
Archive of the Institute of Party History, CC CPU, Safonova lists as
of July 1, 1945, 6133 Orthodox churches and 2326 Uniate congregations
(subsequently forced into the R.O.C.) within the Ukrainian SSR.

3 1.

K. Z. Lytvyn, "Svoboda sovisti--nevid'iemne pravo liudyny," Visti z Ukrainy,
No. 15 (920), Apr. 1976. The figure appears to apply to 1 9 66; the present
total is likely to be lower.

32.

According to a confidential report for 1974 submitted to the CPscr Central
Committee by V. D. Furov, vice-chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs,
the Russian Orthodox Church had by Jan. 1, 1975, 7,062 "registered" churches
and only 5,9 9 4 "registered" priests and 594 deacons, i.e., 70.2 percent
of the clergy it has had in 1961. The report was leaked to a Russian
religious quarterly published in Paris. See "Iz otcheta Soveta po delam
religii chlenam TsK KPSS," Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo D vizheniia,
Vol. 54, No. 130 (IV-1979 ), 289 , 29 7.

33.

As stated by Bishop Feodosii (Dykun) of Poltava in his appeal to L. I.
Brezhnev of Oct. 26, 1977, in which he com�ined about the illegal
interference of the oblast CRA plenipotentiary with the purely religious
activities in the diocese and the plenipotentiary'e"administrative" methods
of combating religion in violation of the constitutional "guarantees of the
freedom of conscience". See "Zvernennia Iepyskopa Feodosiia do Brezhneva,"
Suchasnist , Vol. 21, Nos.
7-8 (July-Aug. 19 81), 160.

34.

Furov, "Iz otcheta Soveta," loc.cit., 3 17.

35.

Ibid., 300.
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Ibid., 3 17.

37.

Of which 16 were reopened in the Central and Eastern Ukraine during the
war-time German occupation.
See the published section of V. D. Furov's
report for 1970, Vestnik Russkogo Khristiinskogo Dvizheniia, Vol.· 55,
No. 13 13.

38.

Ibid.

39.

Ibid., 363-365.

40.

Ibid., 363, 370.

41.

Mgr. Mykolai Charnetskyi, Apostolic Administrator for Volyn, who was
allowed in 1956 to return to Lviv where he died in 1959; and Mgr. Ivan
Liatyshevskyi, Vicar Bishop of Stanislav (now Ivano-Frankivsk), who
returned to Stanislav in June 1955 and died there in Dec. 1 9 57.

42.

For details, see N. Cousins, "The Improbable Triumvirate:
Khrushchev,
Kennedy, and Pope John," Saturday Review, Oct. 30, 1971, 24-35.

43.

A. 0. Ieryshev, Dosvid sotsiolohichnykh doslidzhen relihiinosty (Kiev, 19 67),
68.

44.

According to Metropolitan Nykolai (Iuryk) of Lviv, in an interview given to
The News from Ukraine in 1978.

45.

For a detailed analysis of the episcopate, see this writer's "Religious
Situation in Soviet Ukraine," in H. Dashnyck (ed.), Ukraine in a Changing
'Horld (New York:
Ukrainian Congressional Committee, 19 77), 19 3-1 94. Three
of the Orthodox bishops in 1977 in charge of the "reunited" dioceses of
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USSR," Religion in Communist Lands, v, No. 1 (Spring 1977), 4-12.

47.
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48.

In the mid-1960's, Ieryshev (£R.cit., 68-69) estimated the share of
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Republic. 'Hithin the urban population, believers are said to constitute
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